[Freedom to Choose One's Occupation] 2022 (Ne) 10059 <Honda>
Updated: 6h
Article information
Article type: Case note
Category: Trademarks, Copyright
Topics: —
First published on this website: 2026-11-01
Display and classification checked: November 2, 2026
Originally published on Ameblo: 2025-04-26 (Japan time). Full English translation.
[Freedom to Choose One's Occupation] 2022 (Ne) 10059 <Honda>
*Post-contract restrictions imposed by a talent agency were held contrary to public policy and morals!!
Former members of a band (the first-instance plaintiffs) alleged that, after their exclusive management agreement with their agency (the first-instance defendant company) ended, the agency obstructed their use of the band/group name and continuation of their activities.
1. Invalidity of the Noncompetition Clause
The court held invalid a clause prohibiting contracts with others and activities for six months after termination, finding that it “excessively restricts freedom to choose one's occupation and is contrary to public policy and morals.”
2. Rights in the Band Name
The court recognized publicity rights and performers' moral rights (right of attribution) in the band name for all members, and rejected the agency's claim to exclusive rights of use or trademark rights in that name.
3. Copyright in Photographs
The court also rejected the claim that copyright in the group's photographs belonged to the agency, holding that copyright belonged to the photographers.
4. Illegality of the Agency's Obstructive Acts
The agency's acts of obstructing the plaintiffs' activities through notices and requests containing false information constituted a tort.
5. Damages
A total of ¥990,000: approximately ¥700,000 in pecuniary damages, ¥200,000 for emotional distress, and ¥90,000 in attorney fees
(Excerpts from the court's reasoning)
The first-instance defendants argue that the clause was included to recover upfront investment. However, what appeals to the first-instance plaintiffs' consumers (their fans) is the plaintiffs' performances and the like, not those of other performers affiliated with the first-instance defendant company. Thus, restricting the plaintiffs' performance activities under the clause would not generate profits for the company and thereby achieve the purpose of recovering its upfront investment. There is no relationship between restricting the plaintiffs' activities under the clause and recovering the company's upfront investment. Further, even assuming that the company needed to recover upfront investment and that the plaintiffs bore some responsibility in that regard, a monetary resolution would be possible by such means as distributing profits generated by the plaintiffs' performance activities. That need therefore does not justify restricting the plaintiffs' activities after termination of the exclusive agreement. (In addition, by July 13, 2019, when the exclusive agreement was terminated by mutual consent, approximately nine years had elapsed since its conclusion on August 1, 2010, and approximately seven years even from July 2012, when all of the plaintiffs had joined the group. The agreement had also been renewed several times (Undisputed Facts (2)). In these circumstances, the company would naturally be considered to have already recovered its upfront investment.)
Accordingly, without considering the remaining points, the restrictions imposed by the clause lack any rational basis. It is therefore appropriate to construe the clause as invalid for violating public policy and morals.
Update history
The first-published date remains unchanged. Display maintenance, classification changes, related-article updates, and text corrections are recorded separately.
November 1, 2026: First published on this website.
November 2, 2026: Added article information, classification, topics, language navigation, related articles where the same case was confirmed, consultation guidance, and SEO. The original text and first-published date were preserved.
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